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FROM "THE PURPOSE" TO "A SIGNIFICANT
PURPOSE": ASSESSING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY
OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE
ACT UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
JENNIFER L. SULLIVAN*
This Note is a critical commentary on the state of foreign
intelligence surveillance for national security purposes since the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. In particular, it
addresses the constitutionality of the Foreign Intelligence Sur-
veillance Act of 1978 ("FISA") under the Fourth Amendment as
modified by the amendments enacted in the USA PATRIOT Act
of 2001 ("Patriot Act").' In this Note, I propose that FISA, as
amended by section 218 of the Patriot Act, is constitutional
because it violates neither the Warrant Clause nor the Reasona-
bleness Clause of the Fourth Amendment.
FISA does not violate the Warrant Clause because FISA
court orders fulfill the lawful requirements of a warrant: issuance
by a neutral and disinterested judge, presence of a probable
cause standard, and a particularized account of the locations to
be searched, and the objects and items to be seized. In addition,
FISA does not violate the Reasonableness Clause on two distinct
grounds. First, FISA qualifies under the "special needs" excep-
tion to the Fourth Amendment because the prevention of terror-
ist attacks like September l1th that pose significant damage and
injury is the sort of action that far surpasses the normal role of
law enforcement. Second, FISA also satisfies the criteria for a
limited national security exception to the Fourth Amendment.
Although the Supreme Court has not determined whether a
national security exception to the Fourth Amendment exists, this
foreign intelligence exclusion has been endorsed by many fed-
eral circuit courts of appeal. Further support for the exception
stems from the President's traditionally broad discretion in the
area of foreign affairs, and the fact that, after September l1th,
public policy dictates that the need to protect the United States
* J.D. Candidate, University of Notre Dame Law School, 2005; ThomasJ.
White Scholar 2003-2005; B.A., Harvard University, 2001. Special thanks to
Professor G. Robert Blakey for his assistance in the formation of this Note.
1. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of
2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 [hereinafter Patriot Act].
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from future terrorist attacks far outweighs overstated concerns
regarding individual civil liberties. Thus, the Patriot Act amend-
ments to FISA are vital to ensuring American national security
after September 11th, and these modifications of FISA are consti-
tutional under the Fourth Amendment.
INTRODUCTION
On September 11, 2001, the United States suffered the most
devastating attacks on American soil since the assault on Pearl
Harbor during World War 11.2 In the span of one short hour,
nineteen al Qaeda terrorists crippled the economic and military
hubs of the United States by hijacking and crashing four com-
mercial airplanes into the Twin Towers of New York's World
Trade Center, the Pentagon, and a field southeast of Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania.' The consequences of the September l1th terror-
ist attacks were staggering: approximately three thousand inno-
cent casualties,4 the obliteration of a symbolic national skyline,
and the frightening realization that it has become "increasingly
easy to plan and implement highly destructive terrorist actions in
the territory of another state."
5
The September 11 th terrorist attacks underscored the inade-
quacies of the legislation that had been enacted to combat ter-
rorism in the wake of the Oklahoma City bombing. Five years
before September 11th, critics of the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AiEDPA") prophetically stated, "Con-
gress passed a weak shadow of the original bills, which
respond[ed] too broadly to earlier charges of extremism and is
likely to do little to stop terrorism."6 In an effort to bolster the
2. See Latest Additions to Victims List, AP ONLINE, Feb. 5, 2002, 2002 WL
11688056 (stating that 2,759 deaths had been confirmed in the terrorist attacks
of September 11 th).
3. Michael Grunwald, Terrorists Hijack 4 Airliners, Destroy World Trade
Center, Hit Pentagon; Hundreds Dead; Bush Promises Retribution; Military Put on
Highest Alert, WASH. POST, Sept. 12, 2001, at Al.
4. See Matthew C. Weibe, Comment, Assassination in Domestic and Interna-
tional Law: The Central Intelligence Agency, State-Sponsored Terrorism, and the Right of
Self-Defense, 11 TULSAJ. COMP. & INT'L L. 363, 363 (2003).
5. W. Michael Reisman, International Legal Responses to Terrorism, 22 Hous.
J. INT'L L. 3, 4 (1999).
6. Note, Blown Away? The Bill of Rights after Oklahoma City, 109 HARV. L.
REV. 2074, 2091 (1996). The author argues that the original proposed legisla-
tion after the Oklahoma City tragedy raised concerns about individual civil lib-
erties but was still constitutional legislation. Id. The unwarranted concerns
about reduced civil liberties resulted in a version of the Antiterrorism and Effec-
tive Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") that failed to make any significant
changes to the Federal Bureau of Investigation's surveillance powers. Id. at
2079.
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existing inadequate antiterrorism legislation, Congress quickly
passed the Patriot Act six weeks after the September l1th
attacks.7 This legislation, which has been criticized by civil liber-
ties groups as unconstitutionally infringing on individual privacy
rights,' attempts to provide domestic law enforcement and intel-
ligence agencies with broad powers to fight terrorism and protect
national security interests.9
One of the most controversial aspects of the Patriot Act is
the fact that several provisions significantly "increase the govern-
ment's authority and ability to monitor wire and electronic com-
munication."1" Specifically, section 218 of the Patriot Act
amended the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978
("FISA") by lowering the threshold required to conduct surveil-
lance for national security purposes."1 While authorization for a
FISA court order traditionally entailed certification that "the pur-
pose" of the surveillance was to acquire foreign intelligence,
12
section 218 allows the FISA court to issue a FISA warrant if "a
significant purpose" of the investigation is foreign intelligence
surveillance.13 Critics argue that this seemingly innocuous legis-
lation violates the Fourth Amendment by permitting law enforce-
ment officials to employ the lower probable cause standard of
7. The Senate passed the Patriot Act on October 25, 2001, and it was
signed into law by President Bush on October 26, 2001.
8. See Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union, ACIU Calls for Mon-
itoring of USA Patriot Act (Jan. 24, 2002), at http://www.aclu.org/National-
Security/NationalSecurity.cfm?ID=9710&c=111 (on file with the Notre Dame
Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy); Press Release, Center for Democracy
and Technology, CDT Urges Congress to Move Forward with Legislation to Fix
the Patriot Act (Oct. 14, 2003), at http://www.cdt.org/press/
031014press.shtml (on file with the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public
Policy).
9. See Jonathan Krim & Robert O'Harrow, Jr., Bush Signs into Law New
Enforcement Era; U.S. Gets Broad Electronic Powers, WASH. POST, Oct. 27, 2001, at
A06. According to Krim and O'Harrow, the Patriot Act eases the difficulties of
conducting searches and detaining or deporting suspects of terrorist activity, as
well as allows law enforcement and intelligence to monitor financial transac-
tions and internet communications of targeted individuals. See id.; see also U.S.
DEP'T OFJUSTICE, THE USA PATRIOT AcT: PRESERVING LIFE AND LIBERTY, at http:/
/www.lifeandliberty.gov/patriot.overviewpversion.pdf (last visited Mar. 1,
2005) (on file with the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy).
10. Heath H. Galloway, Note, Don't Forget What We're Fighting For: Will the
Fourth Amendment Be a Casualty of the War on Terror?, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 921,
962 (2002).
11. See Patriot Act § 218, 115 Stat. 291 (2001).
12. See Tracey Topper Gonzalez, Individual Rights Versus Collective Security:
Assessing the Constitutionality of the USA Patriot Act, 11 U. MIAN4I INT'L & COMP. L.
Rrv. 75, 109 (2003).
13. See 50 U.S.C.A. § 1804(a) (7) (b) (2003).
2005]
382 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 19
FISA court orders to surveillance in standard criminal
investigations. 4
However, this constitutional analysis of the Patriot Act
amendments to FISA is flawed. Neither the Warrant Clause nor
the Reasonableness Clause of the Fourth Amendment prohibits
the executive branch from employing FISA court orders to con-
duct surveillance of a particular foreign target if a "significant
purpose" of the investigation is foreign intelligence. FISA court
orders arguably fulfill the three requirements of the Warrant
Clause: authorization by a neutral magistrate, probable cause,
and particularity.'" Furthermore, unprecedented levels of ter-
rorist threats cause the balance between national security and
civil liberties to reasonably swing in the government's favor. Spe-
cifically, the plenary power of the executive branch with respect
to foreign affairs,' 6 the widespread judicial support for a limited
foreign intelligence exception to the Fourth Amendment, 7 and
FISA's similarity to legislation regulating criminal investigations 18
help the Patriot Act amendments satisfy the Reasonableness
Clause of the Fourth Amendment.
This Note focuses on the constitutionality of FISA under the
Fourth Amendment as modified by section 218 of the Patriot Act.
Part I reviews the history of warrantless electronic surveillance for
the purposes of national security, including the inability of Con-
gress and the Supreme Court to propose and monitor standards
regulating the use of such surveillance. Part II discusses the orig-
inal framework of FISA and the initial foreign intelligence pur-
pose standard. Part III explores the Patriot Act and its
amendments to FISA, as well as the recent judicial decisions in
the FISA court and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
14. Brief on Behalf of the American Civil Liberties Union et. al. at 24-26,
In re Sealed Case No. 02-001, 310 F.3d 717 (Foreign Int. Surv. Ct. Rev. 2002),
available at http://archive.aclu.org/court/091902FISCRbrief.pdf (on file with
the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy) [hereinafter ACLU
Brief]. The ACLU brief was joined by the Center for Democracy and Technol-
ogy, Center for National Security Studies, Electronic Privacy Information
Center, Electronic Frontier Foundation, and Open Society Institute. Id.
15. See Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 255 (1979).
16. See William F. Brown & Americo R. Cinquegrana, Warrantless Physical
Searches for Foreign Intelligence Purposes: Executive Order 12,333 and the Fourth
Amendment, 35 CATH. U. L. REV. 97, 106 (1985).
17. See United States v. Brown, 484 F.2d 418, 426 (5th Cir. 1973); United
States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593, 596-97 (3d Cir. 1974); United States v. Buck,
548 F.2d 871, 875 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d
908, 913-16 (4th Cir. 1980).
18. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, Pub. L. No. 90-351, tit.
III, 82 Stat. 211 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2000)) [here-
inafter Title III].
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of Review regarding the constitutionality of FISA's new "signifi-
cant purpose" standard for foreign intelligence surveillance.
Part IV will analyze the constitutionality of the Patriot Act amend-
ments to FISA under the Fourth Amendment. Finally, this paper
will conclude that FISA's new "significant purpose" standard, as
amended by section 218 of the Patriot Act, violates neither the
Warrant Clause nor the Reasonableness Clause of the Fourth
Amendment for both analytical and public policy reasons.
I. FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE PRIOR TO FISA
For approximately fifty years prior to the passage of the orig-
inal Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, Congress and the
Supreme Court struggled to establish the scope and parameters
of electronic surveillance for criminal investigations and foreign
intelligence purposes.1 9 While Congress ultimately reached a
solution with respect to wiretapping for criminal investigations
that satisfied the Supreme Court,"0 a definitive standard for
national security surveillance has been far more elusive. Several
federal circuit courts have deferred to the executive branch of
the federal government for the purpose of foreign intelligence
wiretapping, 1 but the Supreme Court has refused to resolve the
question. 22 The problems inherent in unregulated foreign intel-
ligence surveillance led to the enactment of FISA in 1978.
A. Traditional Constitutional and Legislative Framework for
Electronic Surveillance Under the Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution
provides in part that the "right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated. 21 3 The Supreme
Court was initially presented with the question of whether elec-
tronic wiretapping was per se unconstitutional in Olmstead v.
United States.24 Speaking for the majority in a sharply divided
Court, Chief Justice Taft stated that electronic wiretapping of
"voluntary [telephone] conversations secretly overheard" was
19. Gregory E. Birkenstock, Note, The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
and Standards of Probable Cause: An Alternative Analysis, 80 GEo. L.J. 843, 846-47
(1992).
20. See generally Title III.
21. See Brown, 484 F.2d at 426; Butenko, 494 F.2d at 596-97; Buck, 548 F.2d
at 875; TruongDinh Hung, 629 F.2d. at 913-16.
22. See United States v. United States District Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297,
321-22 (1972).
23. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
24. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
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admissible in a criminal trial because such surveillance did not
constitute an unreasonable search of an "effect" under the
Fourth Amendment.
2 5
The Court's early acceptance of electronic surveillance as
inherently reasonable was short-lived, as Congress placed strict
limits on the use of wiretapping in criminal and intelligence
investigations. The Federal Communications Act of 1934
attempted to place significant restraints on electronic surveil-
lance by completely prohibiting the interception and use of
radio and wire communications,26 and the Supreme Court held
in Nardone v. United States27 that the statutory language of section
605 of the Federal Communications Act of 1934 forbids individu-
als to intercept or publicly disseminate such electronic surveil-
lance.28  However, the executive branch of the federal
government continued to use electronic wiretapping in certain
circumstances by interpreting Nardone to prevent such surveil-
lance "only when it was combined with disclosure of its fruits
outside of the government."29 The Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion ("FBI") specifically interpreted section 605 "as only prevent-
ing the 'divulgence' of information obtained by wiretapping in
court, while not prohibiting wiretapping if the information was
not used at trial."30
The concern that the United States and its citizens were not
being adequately defended during World War II led the execu-
tive branch to utilize electronic surveillance tactics for the pur-
poses of national security. Since Congress failed to pass
legislation authorizing the use of electronic wiretapping for
national security purposes, President Franklin Roosevelt "acted
unilaterally and expressed his desire to Attorney General [Rob-
ert] Jackson that 'listening devices' be used when 'grave matters
involving defense of the nation,' such as espionage or subversion,
might be involved."31 In fact, surveillance of this nature assisted
the United States to ultimately defeatJapan during World War II.
In 1935, before an official American declaration of war, United
25. Id. at 466.
26. Federal Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064, 1103-04
(1934) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 605 (2000)).
27. Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937).
28. Id. at 382.
29. Americo R. Cinquegrana, The Walls (and Wires) Have Ears: The Back-
ground and First Ten Years of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 137 U.
PA. L. Ri-v. 793, 797 (1989).
30. Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth Amendment
Privacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REv. 1083, 1139 (2002) (citing WAYNE R. LAFAVF ET AiL.,
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 260 (3d ed. 2000)).
31. Cinquegrana, supra note 29, at 798.
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States Naval Intelligence officers intruded the Washington, D.C.,
office of the Japanese naval attache, photographed his secret
code machine, and searched the contents of his briefcase.3 2 The
intelligence gathered from this covert surveillance operation led
to the deciphering of the Japanese Naval Code, and supplied
Admiral Chester Nimitz of the American Pacific Fleet with vital
information to defeat the Japanese army during the Battle of
Midway in May 1942." 3 According to Professor G. Robert Blakey,
"America's naval forces were distinctly inferior; America's supe-
rior intelligence laid the foundation for the victory." 4 Such
intelligence practices continued after World War II hostilities
ceased, with President Truman's approval of "broader use of
electronic surveillance" and the FBI's use of "trespassory elec-
tronic surveillance" for issues of national security.35
Congress's inability to control the executive branch's
exploitation of electronic surveillance in criminal and intelli-
gence investigations gave the Supreme Court the opportunity to
reevaluate its property conception of privacy rights under the
Fourth Amendment. In Katz v. United States,3 16 the Court over-
ruled Olmstead and held that the Fourth Amendment properly
applied to the use of electronic surveillance in the absence of
physical trespass." Justice Stewart, speaking for the Katz major-
ity, reaffirmed the Court's position that warrantless searches
"conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval
by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment-subject only to a few specifically established and
well-delineated exceptions."3 While the Court clarified the
point that a warrant is needed to conduct electronic wiretapping
for criminal investigations, the Katz majority buried its refusal to
address the issue of whether a warrant is required for national
security surveillance in a footnote.3 9 Justice White brought this
issue to the forefront in his Katz concurrence, stating that the
Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment should not apply to
national security surveillance if the President or Attorney
32. See G. Robert Blakey, Concurrence, ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE:
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE REVIEW OF FEDERAL AND STATE
LAWS RELATING TO WIRETAPPING AND ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE 208 (1976).
33. See id.
34. Id.
35. Cinquegrana, supra note 29, at 798.
36. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
37. Id. at 353-59.
38. Id. at 357.
39. Id. at 358 n.23 ("Whether safeguards other than prior authorization
by a magistrate would satisfy the Fourth Amendment in a situation involving the
national security is a question not presented by this case.").
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General has authorized such searches as constitutionally
reasonable.4"
One year after the Katz decision, Congress codified the war-
rant requirement for electronic surveillance in criminal investiga-
tions by ratifying Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act ("Title III").41 Under Title III, ajudge or magis-
trate may issue a warrant in a criminal case if probable cause
exists to believe "that an individual is committing, has commit-
ted, or is about to commit a particular offense .... "" However,
Title III's original language indicated that Congress refused to
place restrictions on the President's ability to obtain foreign
intelligence information, ensure the national security of the
United States, and protect the country from aggressive foreign
powers.4 3 Thus, the original language of Title III demonstrated
Congress's recognition of an inherent presidential authority to
authorize warrantless searches for the purposes of foreign affairs
and national security.
4 4
B. Constitutionality of Warrantless Electronic Surveillance for
National Security Purposes
Because neither Katz nor Title III placed any significant
restraints on the executive branch's ability to conduct warrantless
electronic surveillance for national security purposes, the execu-
tive branch operated as if it had "total executive autonomy in
devising and implementing surveillance procedures for internal
security missions."4 5  The President and Attorney General
unequivocally possessed this power until the Supreme Court eval-
uated whether Title III was an implicit grant of authority to the
40. Id. at 364.
41. Title III § 802 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3) (a)
(2000)).
42. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(c).
43. See Cinquegrana, supra note 29, at 801. The original language of sec-
tion 2511(3) read as follows: "[N]othing contained in this chapter . . . shall
limit the constitutional power of the President to take such measures as he
deems necessary to protect the Nation against actual or potential attack or
other hostile acts of a foreign power, to obtain foreign intelligence information
deemed essential to the security of the United States, and or to protect national
security information against foreign intelligence activities ...." Id.; see also Title
III, § 2511(3) (1968) (repealed 1978). Section 2511(3) was repealed in 1978
after the passage of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.
44. See Title III § 802 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2511(3) (1968)).
45. Galloway, supra note 10, at 940. Galloway argues that Congress and
the Supreme Court perpetuated the executive branch's belief that it could con-
duct warrantless electronic surveillance without judicial review whenever it was
imperative to issues of national security. Id. at 940-41.
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executive branch in matters of national security.4 6 In refusing to
determine the "scope of the President's surveillance power with
respect to the activities of foreign powers,""' the Court provided
federal circuit courts with the chance to formulate an exception
to the Fourth Amendment for issues of foreign intelligence and
national security, an opportunity that several courts seized and
answered in the affirmative. These judicial decisions ultimately
paved the way for the ratification of FISA.
1. Keith and the Possibility of a National Security Exception to
the Fourth Amendment
While the Supreme Court only briefly discussed the issue of
electronic wiretapping for national security purposes in Katz, in
United States v. United States District Court (Keith), the Court directly
confronted the President's constitutional ability to conduct war-
rantless electronic surveillance in the area of foreign affairs.48 In
Keith, the United States charged three defendants with conspir-
acy to destroy government property. 49 Law enforcement learned
of the defendants' plan to bomb a Michigan office of the Central
Intelligence Agency ("CIA") by using a wiretap that was author-
ized by Attorney General John Mitchell but received no prior
judicial approval.5" The Court ruled that warrantless electronic
surveillance for the purpose of domestic security is unconstitu-
tional and does not mandate an exception to the requirements
of the Fourth Amendment.5"
Although the Keith Court expressly held that electronic sur-
veillance for domestic security purposes requires judicial
approval, the Court refused to extend its decision beyond the
"domestic aspects of national security."5  First, the Court
acknowledged that Article II of the Constitution "  implicitly
grants the President broad authority in the area of foreign
affairs5 4 but indicated that Title III neither confers nor restricts
46. United States v. United States District Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297
(1972).
47. Id. at 308.
48. Id. at 299.
49. Id. at 297.
50. Id. at 301.
51. Id. at 320.
52. Id. at 321.
53. U.S. CONST. art. II. The Presidential Oath requires the President to
preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States." Id. art.
II, § 1, cl. 7. Keith says that "implicit in that duty is the power to protect our
Government against those who would subvert or overthrow it by unlawful
means." Keith, 407 U.S. at 308.
54. Keith, 407 U.S. at 310.
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the ability of the executive branch to conduct national security
wiretapping without judicial review.55 Second, and more impor-
tandy, the Keith Court recognized that the purposes of ordinary
criminal investigations and foreign intelligence surveillance are
distinct.56 Because the government has a compelling interest in
the preservation of the national security, Justice Powell reasoned
that different standards for national security electronic surveil-
lance "may be compatible with the Fourth Amendment if they
are reasonable both in relation to the legitimate need of Govern-
ment for intelligence information and the protected rights of
our citizens."5 7 Thus, the Keith Court recognized that warrantless
electronic wiretapping for the purpose of national security is not
exempt from the Fourth Amendment but suggested the possibil-
ity that such electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence rea-
sons may be constitutional if, by balancing the national security
against civil liberties, the interests of the government outweigh
the privacy concerns of individual citizens.
2. Lower Court Interpretations of Keith and the National
Security Exception to the Fourth Amendment
By once again sidestepping the issue of whether national
security electronic surveillance conducted without judicial review
is constitutional under the Fourth Amendment, the Supreme
Court opened the door for a variety of conflicting views regard-
ing wiretapping for foreign intelligence purposes. Although only
a handful of federal circuit courts of appeal have addressed the
constitutionality of national security wiretapping, an overwhelm-
ing majority of those courts deciding the question have held that
warrandess electronic surveillance for national security reasons is
a reasonable and legitimate exercise of the President's inherent
power as Commander in Chief, and qualifies as a foreign intelli-
gence exception to the Warrant Clause of the Fourth
Amendment.
One year after the Keith decision, the Fifth Circuit addressed
the same question that the Supreme Court had previously
declined to answer. In United States v. Brown,5" the Fifth Circuit
upheld the legality of warrantless electronic wiretapping for the
purpose of gathering foreign intelligence. 59 The Brown court was
55. Id. at 308. According to justice Powell, nothing in Title III showed an
intent to "expand or to contract or to define whatever presidential surveillance
powers existed in matters affecting the national security." Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 322-23 (emphasis added).
58. 484 F.2d 418, 426 (5th Cir. 1973).
59. Id.
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careful to note that the President and Attorney General are pro-
hibited from authorizing wiretapping without judicial review in
the area of domestic security, but it distinguished the issue of
domestic threats to national security from foreign intelligence
surveillance. The Fifth Circuit reaffirmed Brown in its holding in
United States v. Clay6° and held "that the President may constitu-
tionally authorize warrantless wiretaps for the purpose of gather-
ing foreign intelligence. "61
Shortly after Brown, the same question began to appear
more frequently in federal circuit courts of appeal across the
country. In United States v. Butenko,62 the Third Circuit agreed
that warrantless electronic surveillance for the purpose of
national security was constitutional. As in Brown, the Third Cir-
cuit agreed that Article II of the Constitution implicitly author-
ized the President, through the Attorney General, to broadly
conduct foreign intelligence surveillance.
6" Unlike the Fifth Cir-
cuit, the Butenko court further limited this power by insisting that
wiretapping for reasons of national security must be the primary
purpose of the investigation, and any information collected relat-
ing to criminal proceedings must be incidental to the foreign
intelligence inquiry.6 4 According to CircuitJudge Adams, "Since
the primary purpose of these searches is to secure foreign intelli-
gence information, a judge . . . must, above all, be assured that
this was in fact its primary purpose and that the accumulation of
evidence of criminal activity was incidental.
'6 5 Thus, the Third
Circuit appeared to be more hesitant in supporting a broad for-
eign intelligence exception to the Fourth Amendment, but did
state that the warrant requirement would hinder the executive
branch's ability to adequately protect the national security.
66
Four years later, the Ninth Circuit contributed to the burgeoning
trend among circuit courts with respect to the constitutionality of
foreign intelligence wiretapping. Citing Clay and Butenko, the
Ninth Circuit explicitly held in United States v. Buck
6 7 that the
"foreign security wiretaps are a recognized exception to the gen-
eral warrant requirement [of the Fourth Amendment]."68
60. 430 F.2d 165, 170-72 (5th Cir. 1970), revd on other grounds, 403 U.S.
698 (1971).
61. Brown, 484 F.2d at 426.
62. 494 F.2d 593 (3d Cir. 1974).
63. Id. at 603.
64. Id. at 606.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 604.
67. 548 F.2d 871 (9th Cir. 1977).
68. Id. at 875.
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In 1980, the Fourth Circuit weighed in on the constitutional-
ity of warrantless foreign intelligence surveillance. In United
States v. Truong Dinh Hung,69 the Fourth Circuit considered an
appeal from defendants initially convicted of espionage and con-
spiracy to commit espionage for communicating classified infor-
mation from the United States to the Socialist Republic of
Vietnam during the Paris negotiations in 1977. While the Truong
court held that the executive branch of the government is not
constitutionally required under the Fourth Amendment to
obtain a search warrant to conduct electronic surveillance for
national security purposes, 70 the Fourth Circuit recognized, as
the Third Circuit did in Butenko, that the primary purpose of the
wiretapping operation must apply to foreign intelligence surveil-
lance instead of criminal investigations. According to Judge Win-
ter, "the executive can proceed without a warrant only if it is
attempting primarily to obtain foreign intelligence from foreign
powers or their assistants. ' 71 The Fourth Circuit refused to apply
this foreign intelligence exception to criminal investigations
because "the courts are entirely competent to make the usual
probable cause determination, and because, importantly, individ-
ual privacy interests come to the fore and government foreign
policy concerns recede .... 72 Although the Truong court tried
to provide a workable guideline as to the constitutionality of war-
rantless foreign intelligence surveillance, the primary purpose
doctrine "added yet another dimension to the vexing problem of
how to reconcile the necessities of national security surveillance
with the Fourth Amendment. '73
Despite the popularity of at least a limited foreign intelli-
gence surveillance exception to the Fourth Amendment, one
court refused to follow suit. In Zwiebon v. Mitchell,"4 the D.C. Cir-
cuit ruled that warrantless surveillance used by the Attorney Gen-
eral against the Jewish Defense League ('JDL") to monitor the
violent actions the JDL took against Soviet officials in the United
States violated the Fourth Amendment.75 While the majority
holding reaffirmed Keith by restricting surveillance installed
against a domestic organization by the executive branch for the
69. 629 F.2d 908 (4th Cir. 1980). Although Congress passed FISA in
1978, the warrantless electronic surveillance in question in United States v.
TruongDinh Hung occurred in 1977 and 1978. Id. at 912.
70. Id. at 913.
71. Id. at 916.
72. Id. at 915.
73. Galloway, supra note 10, at 948.
74. 516 F.2d 594 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
75. Id. at 614.
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purpose of national security, a plurality of the court concluded
that "absent exigent circumstances, all warrantless electronic sur-
veillance is unreasonable and therefore unconstitutional."
76
II. THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT OF 1978
One decade after the passage of Title III, Congress decided
to more closely scrutinize the executive branch's use of warrant-
less electronic surveillance for the purpose of national security.
Regardless of the overwhelming support for a limited foreign
intelligence surveillance exception to the Fourth Amendment in
several circuit courts of appeal, executive abuses of surveillance
tactics, such as Watergate, prompted Congress to consider practi-
cal limitations on the scope of wiretapping
7 7 and ultimately enact
FISA.
A. Evolution and Framework of FISA
Despite almost fifty years of judicial attention to both the
constitutionality of warrantless national security wiretapping and
the foreign intelligence surveillance exception to the Fourth
Amendment, the resulting standards "remained obscure, ambig-
uous and inconclusive."78 In 1976, the Senate Select Committee
to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence
Activities ("Church Committee") determined that the executive
branch, including the FBI and the CIA, was consistently abusing
the power to conduct warrantless national security surveillance
against certain targeted groups, including the Women's Libera-
tion Movement and the anti-war movement."
9 Acting on the
Church Committee's recommendations that Congress needed to
implement a statutory framework to monitor and control foreign
intelligence surveillance, Congress passed the Foreign Intelli-
gence Surveillance Act of 1978.81
FISA was enacted to authorize electronic surveillance by the
President or Attorney General toward the investigation of foreign
76. Id. at 614; see also George P. Varghese, Comment, A Sense of Purpose:
The Role of Law Enforcement in Foreign Intelligence Surveillance, 152 U. PA. L. REv.
385, 396 (2003).
77. See Cinquegrana, supra note 29, at 806 (citing FINAL REPORT OF THE
SENATE SELECT COMM. TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS W'ITH RESPECT TO
INTELLIGENCE ACTrWITIES, INTELLIGENCE ACrrvITIES AND THE RIGHTS OF AMERI-
CANS, FINAL REPORT, BOOK II, S. REP. No. 94-755 (1976)) [hereinafter Church
Committee Report].
78. Cinquegrana, supra note 29, at 806.
79. See Varghese, supra note 76, at 397.
80. See Church Committee Report, supra note 77, at 299-302, cited in Cin-
quegrana, supra note 29, at 807.
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powers or agents of foreign powers, which includes terrorist orga-
nizations, for the purpose of acquiring foreign intelligence infor-
mation.8" Such surveillance is limited to the gathering of foreign
intelligence information, which is "information that relates to,
and if concerning a United States person is necessary to, the abil-
ity of the United States to protect against" the following actions
by a foreign power or agent of a foreign power: (a) actual or
potential attack, (b) international terrorism, or (c) clandestine
intelligence activities.8 2
In an effort to provide a modicum of judicial review with
respect to foreign intelligence surveillance, Congress established
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court ("FISC"), comprised
of eleven district court judges appointed by the Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court.8 3 To attain a FISA court order to implement
electronic surveillance against a foreign power or agent, federal
officers must apply for an order approving the wiretapping or
search and seizure of a tangible object and must include a certifi-
cation from the Attorney General that "the purpose of the sur-
veillance is to obtain foreign intelligence information. '84 A FISA
court order will be issued if a FISC judge finds that there is"probable cause to believe that the target is a foreign power or an
agent of a foreign power and that she is using, or about to use,
the facilities targeted by the surveillance."85 In addition, FISA
mandates that the information gathered during the surveillance
be used for law enforcement purposes only with authorization
from the Attorney General and advance notification to the
defendant.8 6 Defendants may challenge a FISA order only on
the grounds that the information was unlawfully obtained or that
81. See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1802 (2000). An agent of a foreign power is
defined as a non-United States citizen acting on behalf of a foreign power
within the borders of the United States. Id. § 1801(b) (1) (A). Under § 1801,
Congress established a higher standard for targeted United States citizens,
requiring that a United States citizen "knowingly engages in clandestine intelli-
gence" activities before surveillance may be authorized. Id. § 1801 (b) (2) (A); see
also id. § 1801 (i).
82. Id. § 1801 (e)(1)(a)-(c).
83. Id. § 1803(a). The original FISA mandated the appointment of seven
district courtjudges, but this number was increased to eleven by the Patriot Act.
See Patriot Act § 208.
84. 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a) (7) (B) (2000). This statute was later amended to
change "the purpose" to "a significant purpose." See Patriot Act § 218. Addi-
tionally, section 215 of the Patriot Act states that officials "may make an applica-
tion for an order requiring the production of any tangible things .. .for an
investigation to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelli-
gence activities . . . ." Patriot Act § 215.
85. Varghese, supra note 76, at 400.
86. 50 U.S.C. § 1806(b)-(c) (2000).
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the information acquired surpassed the grant of authority in the
FISA order.8 7 Such challenges arose often in district courts and
circuit courts of appeals nationwide shortly after the passage of
FISA.
B. Constitutionality of FISA and the Primary Purpose Standard for
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Between the passage of the original FISA and Patriot Act
amendments, FISA was challenged several times on the grounds
that its reduced probable cause standard violated the Warrant
Clause of the Fourth Amendment. However, the legislative his-
tory indicates that FISA was never intended to satisfy the tradi-
tional requirements of the Warrant Clause. FISA was enacted to
obtain foreign intelligence information, which is vital to national
security, an interpretation that was reaffirmed by most circuit
courts in the manner of Truong and Butenko.
88
In United States v. Duggan," the Second Circuit heard an
appeal from defendants convicted of conspiracy to smuggle
weapons to the Irish Republican Army. The defendants chal-
lenged the government's use of foreign intelligence surveillance
obtained pursuant to a FISA court order to convict the defend-
ants at trial. Duggan confirmed the primary purpose standard
stated in Truong and asserted that "the procedures fashioned in
FISA [are] a constitutionally adequate balancing of the individ-
ual's Fourth Amendment rights against the nation's need to
obtain foreign intelligence information."
9
Furthermore, in United States v. Pelton,
9 1 the Fourth Circuit
determined that FISA surveillance of a defendant convicted of
espionage and conspiracy to commit espionage by transmitting
National Security Agency information to the Soviet Union was
constitutional under the Fourth Amendment. The Pelton court
recognized that the surveillance fulfilled the primary purpose
standard and stated that "FISA's numerous safeguards provide
sufficient protection for the rights guaranteed by the Fourth
Amendment within the context of foreign intelligence
activities."92
87. See id. § 1806(e).
88. See Varghese, supra note 76, at 402-03.
89. 743 F.2d 59 (2d Cir. 1984).
90. Id. at 73.
91. 835 F.2d 1067 (4th Cir. 1987).
92. Id. at 1075.
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However, the Ninth Circuit refused to explicitly affirm the
primary purpose test in United States v. Sarkissian.9 3 The Sarkis-
sian court posited that the distinction between foreign intelli-
gence surveillance and criminal investigations is almost
immaterial and "passed on the question of whether Truong is the
constitutional standard in a criminal prosecution."9 4 The court
refused to "draw too fine a distinction between criminal and
intelligence investigations" because acts of international terror-
ism ultimately entail criminal investigations because terrorism is
also a criminal offense.9"
The conflict among circuit courts regarding whether the
Truong test should apply to FISA court orders was temporarily
resolved when former Attorney General Janet Reno formally
adopted the primary purpose standard for contact between the
FBI and the Office of Intelligence Policy and Review ("OIPR").
Attorney General Reno "designed new minimization procedures
in 1995 that had the practical effect of preventing criminal inves-
tigators from exerting any influence on FISA investigations."9 6
Thus, the Truong primary purpose standard was effectively imple-
mented as the guiding line between law enforcement and for-
eign intelligence surveillance, but the failure of the Supreme
Court to decisively address this question led to the legislative
alteration of this standard after the terrorist attacks of September
11, 2001.
III. FISA AND TH4E IMPACT OF THE TERRORIST ATTACKS OF
SEPTEMBER 11, 2001, ON FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY PURPOSES
In response to September l1th, legislators and administra-
tors immediately began drafting comprehensive legislation to
address the inadequacies and inefficiencies of United States law
enforcement with respect to terrorism detection and prevention.
The Patriot Act addressed several areas of the law but focused
intensely on the government's foreign intelligence surveillance
capabilities. It became clear that the current state of national
security investigations was woefully under-equipped to deal with
the types of terrorist threats and attacks that materialized on Sep-
tember 11th. For example, it is possible that had the barriers of
93. 841 F.2d 959 (9th Cir. 1988).
94. Varghese, supra note 76, at 405.
95. Sarkissian, 841 F.2d at 965.
96. John E. Branch II, Statutory Misinterpretation: The Foreign Intelligence
Court of Review's Interpretation of the "Significant Purpose" Requirement of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act, 81 N.C. L. REv. 2075, 2083 (2003).
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the Truong primary purpose test not been implemented in the
Attorney General procedural framework, FBI law enforcement
could have easily obtained a FISA court order to search the com-
puter of Zacarias Moussaoui, the so-called "twentieth hijacker.""
7
Special Agent Coleen Rowley's memo to FBI Director Robert
Mueller revealed that law enforcement's ability to gain FISA
search warrants for foreign intelligence purposes had been frus-
trated by the Truong test, and permission to search Moussaoui's
computer could possibly have prevented the September l1th
attacks.
9 8
A. The Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001, and the
9/11 Commission
On September 11, 2001, American Airlines Flight 11 crashed
into the South Tower of the World Trade Center in New York
City at approximately 8:45 in the morning.
99 Flabbergasted
Americans across the country watched live television coverage of
the event and remained optimistic that the airplane's collision
with the World Trade Center was an accident.'
0 0 These hopes
were dashed at 9:05 in the morning, as United Airlines Flight 175
slammed into the North Tower of the New York World Trade
Center.'0 ' Forty minutes later, American Airlines Flight 77 hit
the Pentagon in Washington, D.C., and at 10:15 in the morning,
United Airlines Flight 93, believed to be aimed at the White
House, crashed in a field outside of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.
0 2
And only twenty minutes later, the two World Trade Center Tow-
97. See Varghese, supra note 76, at 408-09.
98. See Coleen Rowley's Memo to FBI Director Robert Mueller: An Edited Version
of the Agent's 13-Page Letter, TIME ONLINE EDITION, May 21, 2002, at http://
www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,249
9 9 7 ,00.html (on file with the
Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy) [hereinafter Rowley
Memo]. Agent Rowley stated:
The fact is that key [FBI Headquarters] personnel whose job it was to
assist and coordinate with field division agents on terrorism investiga-
tions and the obtaining and use of FISA searches ... continued to,
almost inexplicably, throw up roadblocks and undermine Minneapo-
lis' by-now desperate attempts to obtain a FISA search warrant ....
Id.
99. See Galloway, supra note 10, at 922 (citing America Attacked: World Trade
Center, Large Part of Pentagon Destroyed in Terrorist Attack, at http://usgovinfo.
about.com/library/blattack09l1.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2005) (on file with the
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ers and a significant portion of the Pentagon lay in ruins. 0 5 In
less than one hour, nineteen fanatical terrorists, wielding only
razors or boxcutters, shattered the naive American belief that
two expansive oceans and top-notch national security made the
borders of the United States impervious to international terror-
ism. The September 11th attacks brought large-scale terrorism,
which only seemed to exist in Europe and the Middle East, into
the living rooms of millions of Americans for the first time.
All facets of the national government mobilized in response
to the September l1th terrorist attacks. Attorney General John
Ashcroft conducted a large-scale investigation resulting in the
arrest of over six hundred possible suspects or material witnesses,
and President George W. Bush commenced diplomatic actions to
locate and arrest Usama bin Laden, the terrorist leader of al
Qaeda who had taken responsibility for the September 11th
attacks. 0 4 However, the most significant reaction to September
11th was the rapid enactment of the Patriot Act. Attorney Gen-
eral Ashcroft implored Congress to approve the pending legisla-
tion quickly, as "the American people do not have the luxury of
unlimited time in erecting the necessary defenses to future ter-
rorist acts."' 5 As a result, Congress passed the Patriot Act on
October 25, 2001, and President Bush signed the legislation into
law the following day.10
6
In the few years since the terrorist attacks of September 11th
and the passage of the Patriot Act, it has become clear that severe
structural deficiencies in the executive branch of the federal gov-
ernment prevented law enforcement and intelligence officials
from discovering and preventing the September 11th attacks.
According to Attorney General Ashcroft, "law enforcement tools
created decades ago were crafted for rotary telephone-not
email, the Internet, mobile communications, and voice mail.
Every day that passes with outdated statutes and the old rules of
engagement-each day that so passes is a day that terrorists have
a competitive advantage."1 7 Furthermore, there were significant
legal and bureaucratic obstacles between the CIA and the FBI
103. See id.
104. See Galloway, supra note 10, at 924.
105. John Ashcroft, Testimony Before the House Committee on the Judi-
ciary (Sept. 24, 2001), at http://ww.usdoj.gov/ag/testimony/2001/agcrisis-
remarks9_24.htm (on file with the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public
Policy) (hereinafter Ashcroft Testimony].
106. See generally Patriot Act.
107. Ashcroft Testimony, supra note 105.
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which prevented the collecting and sharing of foreign intelli-
gence surveillance between intelligence and law enforcement.J10
The rigid "wall" that divided federal law enforcement and
intelligence agencies arguably is a major reason for the inability
of law enforcement to detect and prevent the September l1th
terrorist attacks. 10 9 Two documents-the "Phoenix memo" and
the Rowley letter-clearly demonstrate the problems inherent in
the pre-September 1 1th national security surveillance structure.
First, FBI Agent Kenneth Williams issued a memorandum on July
10, 2001, from the Phoenix branch of the FBI, urging high-level
investigators to monitor the attendance at aviation universities
and colleges. 110 The purpose of the Phoenix memorandum was
to "advise [the FBI] and New York of the possibility of a coordi-
nated effort by Usama bin Laden to send students to the United
States to attend civil aviation universities and colleges."111 Sec-
ond, FBI Agent Coleen Rowley sent FBI Director Robert Mueller
a letter less than one month before the September 1lth attacks.
The letter detailed the obstacles that the current structure
imposed in acquiring a FISA court order to search Zacarias
Moussaoui's computer, a search that may have revealed al
Qaeda's terrorist plot with enough notice to thwart the attacks.
Specifically, Agent Rowley's May 2002 letter indicated that "key
[FBI Headquarters] personnel whose job it was to assist and coor-
dinate with field division agents on terrorism investigations and
the obtaining and use of FISA searches ... continued to, almost
inexplicably, throw up roadblocks and undermine Minneapolis'
by-now desperate attempts to obtain a FISA search warrant.""1 2
The deficiencies in the pre-September 11th surveillance
structure that were further exposed by these two "smoking gun"
documents prompted a congressional hearing in June 2002, and
the establishment of the National Commission on Terrorist
Attacks Upon the United States ("9/11 Commission"). On June
6, 2002, FBI Director Mueller testified to the proposed and ongo-
108. Press Release, The White House, National Security Advisor Dr. Con-
doleeza Rice, Opening Remarks, The National Commission on Terrorist
Attacks Upon the United States 8 (Apr. 8, 2004), available at http://www.9-
1lcommission.gov/heafings/hearing9/rice-statement.pdf (on file with the
Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy) [hereinafter Rice
Testimony].
109. See id.
110. 2001 FBI Memo Warned of Bin Laden Aviation Cadre, at http://
www.thesmokinggun.com/archive/0412042phoenixl.html (last visited Mar. 1,
2005) (on file with the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy)
[hereinafter Phoenix Memo].
111. Id.
112. Rowley Memo, supra note 98.
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ing changes to the structure of law enforcement, including the
fact that "the FBI's shift towards terrorism prevention necessi-
tates the building of a national level expertise and body of knowl-
edge . . that can be readily shared with our Intelligence
Community and law enforcement partners.""'
President Bush created the 9/11 Commission in late 2002, a
few months after the Judiciary Committee's June 2002 hearing
on counterterrorism. The purpose of the 9/11 Commission was
to "prepare a full and complete account of the circumstances sur-
rounding the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, including
preparedness for and the immediate response to the attacks."'1 4
The 9/11 Commission, which published The 9/11 Commission
Report ("Commission Report") on July 22, 2004, heard testimony
from many high-level intelligence officials in the Bush adminis-
tration, including Dr. Condoleezza Rice, the National Security
Advisor. The 9/11 Commission issued a comprehensive report
detailing the findings on the current state of foreign intelligence
surveillance." 5 In Staff Statement No. 9, the 9/11 Commission
reported that the "wall" between intelligence and law enforce-
ment "caused agents to be less aggressive than they might other-
wise have been in pursuing [FISA] surveillance powers in
counterterrorism investigations.' 1 16  Staff Statement No. 12 dis-
cusses the implementation of changes to foreign.intelligence sur-
veillance after the passage of the Patriot Act and indicates that
the removal of the "wall" has facilitated the acquisition of FISA
court orders to conduct national security surveillance of foreign
powers and agents of foreign powers, but law enforcement and
intelligence organizations are still striving for greater fluidity and
113. Robert S. Mueller III, Testimony of the Honorable Robert S. Muel-
ler III Before the Oversight Hearing on Counterterrorism (June 6, 2002), avail-
able at http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=279&wit__id=608 (on file
with the Notre DameJournal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy) [hereinafter Muel-
ler Testimony].
114. Nat'l Comm'n on Terrorist Attacks upon the U.S., National Commis-
sion on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, at http://www.9-1Icommis-
sion.gov/.
115. See generally NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S.,
THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT (2004), available at http://www.9-llcommis-
sion.gov/report/index.htm (on file with the Notre DameJournal of Law, Ethics
& Public Policy) [hereinafter 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT].
116. NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST ATrAcKs UPON THE U.S., STAFF STATE-
MENT No. 9: LAw ENFORCEMENT, COUNTERTERRORISM, AND INTELLIGENCE COL-
LEcTION IN THE UNITED STATES PRIOR TO 9/11, at 7 (2004), available at http://
www.9-1 1 commission.gov/staff statements/staff statement_9.pdf (on file with
the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy).
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seamlessness with respect to foreign intelligence surveillance. "
7
Dr. Condoleezza Rice's statements to the 9/11 Commission
affirm the findings of the staff reports and illustrate an important
point in assessing the Patriot Act amendments to FISA: "Presi-
dent Bush [has] .. .broken down the bureaucratic walls and
legal barriers that prevented the sharing of vital threat informa-
tion.., in a way that is consistent with protecting America's cher-
ished civil liberties and with preserving our character as a free
and open society."11 8
Ultimately, with respect to the sharing of intelligence infor-
mation between law enforcement and intelligence agencies, the
9/11 Commission concluded that Reno's 1995 procedures had
been misinterpreted and misapplied, resulting in a great deal of
confusion with respect to the amount and what type of informa-
tion could be freely shared between these groups.'1 9 Without
these impediments, the 9/11 Commission indicated that the
Phoenix Memo would likely have been distributed to the appro-
priate agencies in a timely fashion, and Moussaoui and his com-
puter may have been more thoroughly investigated, possibly
exposing the September 11th terrorist plot before its execu-
tion."' According to the Commission Report, "[T] hese individual
cases did not become national priorities," and there is "little evi-
dence that the progress of the [9/11 terrorist] plot was disturbed
by any government action."12 1 Thus, the Commission concluded
that the "wall" between law enforcement and intelligence thor-
117. See NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., STAFF
STATEMENT No. 12: REFORMING LAW ENFORCEMENT, COUNTERTERRORISM, AND
INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION IN THE UNITED STATES 7-8 (2004), available at http:/
/www.9-11 commission.gov/staffstatements/staff statement_1 2.pdf (on file
with the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy).
118. Rice Testimony, supra note 108, at 9.
119. See9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 115, at 78-79, 271. The 9/
11 Commission determined that several factors contributed to the establish-
ment of the "wall" between law enforcement and intelligence. While discussing
these factors goes beyond the scope of this article, the list of factors includes:
(1) the Office of Intelligence Policy and Review assumed the role of conduit of
information to the Criminal Division of the FBI, even though Reno's proce-
dures did not include such a provision; (2) the prohibition of sharing intelli-
gence information between FBI agents and criminal prosecutors, which
morphed into an artificial barrier among FBI agents; (3) the misconception
that FBI agents were prevented from sharing intelligence information with
criminal prosecutors, even if FISA had not been invoked; (4) executive orders
restricting the flow of this information; and (5) the implementation by some
agencies, including the NSA, of requiring permission before sharing intelli-
gence information with criminal prosecutors. See id. at 79-80.
120. See id. at 272, 276.
121. Id. at 277.
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oughly hindered American counterterrorism investigation in
2001.
B. The Patriot Act Amendments to FISA
While staff statements, Dr. Rice's testimony, and the Commis-
sion Report itself indicate a general problem with the traditional
structure of FISA prior to the September l1th terrorist attacks
and comment that the Patriot Act amendments are a vast
improvement to the prior regime, it is necessary to examine the
specific provisions in greater detail. The most significant portion
of the Patriot Act affected FISA and the Truong primary purpose
standard. As stated in Part II.A, the original language of FISA
required that the Attorney General may authorize foreign intelli-
gence surveillance if "the purpose" of the investigation was to
gather foreign intelligence information, a requirement that
evolved into "the primary purpose" based on the jurisprudence
of several circuit courts of appeal.12 2 However, section 218 of the
Patriot Act changed section 1804(a) (7) (b) to require a desig-
nated member of the executive branch to certify that "a signifi-
cant purpose of the surveillance is to obtain foreign intelligence
information. '"123 The Act amended FISA so that "intelligence
officials may coordinate efforts with law enforcement officials to
investigate or protect against attacks, terrorism, sabotage, or clan-
destine intelligence activities without undermining the required
certification of the 'significant purpose' of FISA orders. 1 24
Approximately four months after the passage of the Patriot Act,
Attorney General John Ashcroft executed these amendments by
creating a set of Department of Justice ("DOJ") policies to gov-
ern the exchange of information between the FBI and the
OIPR. 125 Thus, the Patriot Act and its subsequent incorporation
into Department of Justice policy effectively removed the wall
that Attorney General Reno had erected between criminal inves-
tigations and foreign intelligence surveillance.
122. See supra Part II.A.
123. Patriot Act § 218.
124. Michael J. Bulzomi, Foreign Intelligence Suveillance Act, L. ENFORCE-
MENT BuLL., June 2003, at 25, 28, available at http://www.fbi.gov/publications/
leb/2003/une03leb.pdf (on file with the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics &
Public Policy).
125. Id.
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C. Judicial Opinions Regarding the Constitutionality of FISA and
the "Significant Purpose" Standard as Amended by the Patriot Act
After Attorney General Ashcroft adopted these new informa-
tion-sharing policies, the government made a motion to the For-
eign Intelligence Surveillance Court ("FISC") on May 17, 2002,
to "vacate the minimization and 'wall' procedures in all cases
now or ever before the Court, including this Court's adoption of
the Attorney General's July 1995 intelligence sharing proce-
dures .... ,"126 The FISC granted the DOJ's motion, but not with-
out making substantial modifications to parts of the proposed
minimization procedures, which included preserving the "wall"
between law enforcement and foreign intelligence surveillance
and maintaining the policies put in place in 1995 by former
Attorney General Reno. 2 7 According to the FISC, the proposed
DOJ procedures did not adequately safeguard civil liberties, and
it was concerned that "if criminal prosecutors direct both the
intelligence and criminal investigations, or a single investigation
having combined interests, coordination becomes subordination of
both investigations or interests to law enforcement objectives."
'1 28
On appeal by the DOJ, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court of Review ("Court of Review"), in its first opinion since its
creation in 1978, reversed and remanded the ruling of the FISC.
The Court of Review held that "FISA, as amended by the Patriot
Act, supports the government's position, and that the restrictions
imposed by the FISA court are not required by FISA or the Con-
stitution."' 2 9 The Court of Review determined that FISA did not
require the government to demonstrate that criminal prosecu-
tion was not the primary purpose of the foreign intelligence sur-
veillance, which essentially abandons the Truong test, and did not
prohibit the DOJ from utilizing foreign intelligence information
in criminal proceedings where a significant purpose of the FISA
surveillance was for the purpose of gathering national security
information. 3 0 Furthermore, the Court of Review determined
that the Patriot Act amendments to FISA, including the "signifi-
cant purpose" test, did not violate the Fourth Amendment. The
126. In re All Matters Submitted to the Foreign Int. Surv. Court, 218 F.
Supp. 2d 611, 613 (Foreign Int. Surv. Ct. Rev. 2002).
127. See id. at 625-26.
128. Id. at 623-24.
129. In re Sealed Case No. 02-001, 310 F.3d 717, 719-20 (Foreign Int.
Surv. Ct. Rev. 2002) (citation omitted).
130. Id. at 727. "In sum, we think that the FISA as passed by Congress in
1978 clearly did not preclude or limit the government's use or proposed use of
foreign intelligence information, which included evidence of certain kinds of
criminal activity, in a criminal prosecution." Id.
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Court of Review determined that the circumstances surrounding
national security crimes necessarily dictate a lower standard for
FISA authorization than criminal search warrants, and the Patriot
Act's "significant purpose" standard is reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment.' 3'
IV. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF FISA AS AMENDED BY § 218 OF THE
PATRIOT ACT
The Supreme Court has yet to determine whether FISA, as
amended by section 218 of the Patriot Act, is constitutional.
Without a Supreme Court case directly on point, the federal cir-
cuit courts of appeal are free to independently draw their own
conclusions as to whether this version of FISA satisfies the
requirements of the Fourth Amendment. While the decision of
the Court of Review binds only the FISC and is not controlling
authority in any other federal court, In re Sealed Case provides sig-
nificant guidance to federal district courts and circuit courts of
appeal in determining the constitutionality of FISA. There are
several compelling arguments-many of which are explained in
the opinion of the Court of Review-that illustrate FISA's ability
to comply with both independent elements of the Fourth
Amendment. First, FISA and the Patriot Act amendments do not
violate the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment. Many
courts view FISA court orders as search warrants, and FISA tech-
nically satisfies the elements of a valid warrant cataloged in Dalia
v. United States.'32 Second, if FISA court orders are indeed not
traditional search warrants, FISA certainly fulfills the Fourth
Amendment's Reasonableness Clause. In the wake of September
I Ith, the government's compelling interest in issues of national
security, combined with the President's inherent authority in the
area of foreign affairs, contributes to the constitutionality of FISA
and the "significant purpose" test of section 218 of the Patriot
Act.
A. FISA Does Not Violate the Warrant Clause of the
Fourth Amendment
The Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment states, "no
warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath
131. ELIZABETH B. BAZAN, THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT:
AN OVERVIEW OF THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK AND RECENTJUDICIAL DECISIONS 80
(Cong. Research Serv. Report, No. RL30465, 2003), available at http://
www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL30465.pdf (on file with the Notre DameJournal of Law,
Ethics & Public Policy).
132. See Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 255 (1979).
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or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized."' 3  No court
has definitively determined that FISA court orders are the types
of search warrants envisioned by the Fourth Amendment, and, in
fact, the Court of Review declined to resolve this issue in In re
Sealed Case.'3 4 However, there is some judicial support for the
contention that FISA court orders qualify as traditional search
warrants.1" 5 In order for FISA court orders to fulfill the Warrant
Clause of the Fourth Amendment, the FISA orders must satisfy
the Dalia Court's three requirements for traditional warrants in
criminal investigations:
First, warrants must be issued by neutral, disinterested
magistrates. Second, those seeking the warrant must
demonstrate to the magistrate their probable cause to
believe "the evidence sought will aid in a particular appre-
hension or conviction" for a particular offense. Finally,
"warrants must particularly describe the 'things to be
seized,' as well as the place to be searched."1 3 6
FISA court orders clearly satisfy the first prong of the Dalia
test for the constitutionality of search warrants. Typical applica-
tions for search warrants under Title III for electronic surveil-
lance must "be made in writing upon oath or affirmation to a
judge of competent jurisdiction.... ."17 Similarly, under section
1803 of FISA, applications for FISA warrants are received and
reviewed by the members of the FISC.138 The Chief'Justice of the
Supreme Court selects the FISC "from seven of the United States
judicial circuits."39 Several courts unanimously agree that a
"FISCjudge qualifies as a neutral and detached magistrate and is
an Article III judge.1
140
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134. Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 741. The Court of Review stated that "a FISA
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refused to resolve the issue in the opinion. Id.
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The third element, which requires that the warrant describe
with particularity the objects to be seized and the locations that
will be searched, is almost as easily satisfied as the first prong of
the Dalia test. Section 1804(a) of FISA requires that any federal
officer applying for a FISA court order must submit a lengthy
and detailed application for electronic surveillance,"' and these
factors clearly fulfill both aspects of the particularity require-
ment. First, the seized items or objects must be included in the
warrant under section 1804(a) (6), which states that each FISA
order must include "a detailed description of the nature of the
information sought and the type of communications or activities
to be subjected to the surveillance." '14 2 Second, the locations that
will be "searched" (under surveillance) are listed in the FISA
order under section 1804(4) (b), which asserts that the applica-
tion must include a "statement of the facts and circumstances
relied upon by the applicant to justify his belief that each of the
facilities or places at which the electronic surveillance is directed
is being used, or is about to be used, by a foreign power or an
agent of a foreign power."14 These elements are required in
every FISA order because the Attorney General must certify that
all elements of the FISA application under section 1804(a) have
been fulfilled. 44
Probable cause, the second element of the Dalia warrant
test, is the most controversial with respect to FISA surveillance.
FISA does have a probable cause standard, but it differs from the
probable cause standard in Title III. Title III "authorizes elec-
tronic surveillance if it determines that 'there is a probable belief
that an individual is committing, has committed, or is about to
commit' a specified predicate offense." '4 5 FISA requires a
reduced standard of probable cause, which only entails certifica-
tion that the subject of the electronic surveillance is a foreign
power or acting as an agent of a foreign power. 4 6 However, this
difference is not an oversight-the legislative history of FISA
indicates that Congress did not intend FISA and Title III to have
equivalent probable cause standards. Congress burdened FISA
with additional safeguards that it did not impose on Title III,
including the inability to use FISA for domestic terrorism pur-
141. 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a) (2000).
142. Id. § 1804(a)(6).
143. Id. § 1804(a) (4) (2).
144. Id. § 1804(a)(1-11).
145. Bungard, supra note 140, at 27 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(a)
(2000)).
146. 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a) (4) (A).
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poses.1 4 And while civil liberties groups have questioned
whether FISA's probable cause standard infringes upon individ-
ual freedoms, it only applies to foreign powers or agents of foreign
powers, and FISA consistently has been held constitutional by
several district courts and circuit courts of appeal since its enact-
ment in 1978.148
B. FISA Does Not Violate the Reasonableness Clause of the
Fourth Amendment
In order for law enforcement officials to conduct warrantless
electronic surveillance pursuant to either of these exceptions to
the Fourth Amendment, the wiretapping must satisfy the Reason-
ableness Clause of the Fourth Amendment. The Reasonableness
Clause of the Fourth Amendment states that "the right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be vio-
lated."14 9 In interpreting this clause, the Supreme Court has
consistently held that the reasonableness of the search is deter-
mined by "balancing its intrusion on the individual's Fourth
Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate govern-
mental interests." 150
Assuming that FISA court orders do not satisfy the tradi-
tional warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment as inter-
preted by the Dalia Court,1 5 1 electronic surveillance for the
purpose of national security requires a valid exception to the
Fourth Amendment that excuses the search's lack of prior judi-
cial review. Two compelling justifications exist to support the
constitutionality of FISA as amended by the Patriot Act. First,
FISA qualifies under the "special needs" exception to the Fourth
Amendment, which allows "reasonable, warrantless searches for
147. See In re Sealed Case No. 02-001, 310 F.3d 717, 739 (Foreign Int.
Surv. Ct. Rev. 2002); see also Bungard, supra note 140, at 31 ("The fact that FISA
provides replacements for Title III procedures make it seem equally safe-
guarded against infringement upon liberties.").
148. United States v. Cavanagh, 807 F.2d 787, 792 (9th Cir. 1987); United
States v. Pelton, 835 F.2d 1067, 1075 (4th Cir. 1987); United States v. Falvey, 540
F. Supp. 1306, 1316 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
149. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
150. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979); see also Tennessee v.
Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8 (1985). In Garner, the Court looks at all surrounding
circumstances to determine whether the government's interests outweigh the
.nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment
interests." Id. (quoting United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983)).
151. See Bungard, supra note 140, at 31.
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government needs that go beyond regular law enforcement. '"152
Second, the government's compelling interest in preserving the
national security bolsters the argument in favor of adopting a
national security exception to the Fourth Amendment that
would encompass FISA as amended by the Patriot Act.
1. FISA Qualifies Under the "Special Needs" Exception to the
Fourth Amendment
A "special needs" exception to the Fourth Amendment has
long been recognized by the Supreme Court. In New Jersey v.
T.L.O.,' 58 Justice Blackmun stated in his concurrence that
"[o]nly in those exceptional circumstances in which special
needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the
warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable, is a
court entitled to substitute its balancing of interests for that of
the Framers."' 54 Justice Blackmun's concurrence with respect to
the special needs doctrine was subsequently accepted by a major-
ity of the Court in Griffin v. Wisconsin."5' The special needs
exception has been applied in several contexts, including alcohol
and drug testing for railway employees,1 56 drug testing for
United States Customs Service employees,"5 7 drunk driving
checkpoints,158 and drug testing for public officials.' 59
Using the Griffin balancing test, FISA and its "significant pur-
pose" standard can be justified under the special needs excep-
tion to the Fourth Amendment. Admittedly, the "significant
purpose" test outlined in section 218 of the Patriot Act authorizes
law enforcement and foreign intelligence agencies to more freely
share information acquired through FISA surveillance and allows
FISA wiretapping when criminal prosecution is a major goal of
the operation. However, the "significant purpose" standard is
152. Testimony of John Yoo Before Hearing on Securing Freedom and
the Nation Collecting Intelligence under the Law, Constitutional and Public
Policy Considerations (Oct. 30, 2003), at http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/
2003_hr/103003yoo.pdf (on file with the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics &
Public Policy).
153. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
154. Id. at 351.
155. 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987). Specifically, Griffin recognized the special
needs exception to the Fourth Amendment when law enforcement officials
require such searches for reasons beyond the normal needs of law enforce-
ment. Id.
156. Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665-66
(1989).
157. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989).
158. Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 444-50 (1990).
159. Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 313 (1997).
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justified under the special needs doctrine because, in the wake of
September 11 th, the detection and prevention of terrorist attacks
is the type of emergency hazard that far surpasses the "normal"
need for law enforcement. The traditional "wall" between law
enforcement and foreign intelligence surveillance handicapped
the government's investigations of terrorist activity, and the gov-
ernment's interest in maintaining this reduced standard out-
weighs individual civil liberties in light of the possibility of future
attacks of a greater scale than September l1th.
Opponents of the Patriot Act amendment argue that the
"significant purpose" standard allows the government to circum-
vent Title III's warrant requirement and masks criminal prosecu-
tions as FISA electronic surveillance. 160 However, the Court of
Review acknowledged that "FISA's general programmatic pur-
pose, to protect our nation against terrorists and espionage
threats directed by foreign powers, has from its outset been dis-
tinguishable from 'ordinary crime control.'"16 In City of Indian-
apolis v. Edmond,16 2 the Court held that a highway checkpoint was
erected for the primary purpose of ordinary criminal law
enforcement and did not meet the requirements of the special
needs doctrine.1 63 However, the Court stated that "the Fourth
Amendment would almost certainly permit an appropriately tai-
lored roadblock set up to thwart an imminent terrorist attack."
'16 4
The Edmond decision indicates that the Court will consider the
nature and gravity of the threat involved when applying the spe-
cial needs doctrine, and the prevention of terrorism likely justi-
fies the "significant purpose" test under this exception.
2. FISA Qualifies Under a Limited Foreign Intelligence
Exception to the Fourth Amendment
Although FISA's "significant purpose" standard finds ade-
quate support under the special needs exception, the more com-
pelling argument in favor of its constitutionality is that FISA
would satisfy the requirements of a limited foreign intelligence
exception to the Fourth Amendment. While the Supreme Court
has not addressed this question, there is a significant body of
jurisprudence among federal district courts and circuit courts of
160. See, e.g., Stephanie Kornblum, Winning the Battle White Losing the War:
Ramifications of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review's First Decision, 27
SEATrLE U. L. REv. 623, 627 (2003).
161. In re Sealed Case No. 02-001, 310 F.3d 717, 746 (Foreign Int. Surv.
Ct. Rev. 2002).
162. 531 U.S. 32 (2000).
163. Id. at 41-42.
164. Id. at 44.
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appeal indicating a growing support for such a national security
doctrine. 6 5 The existence of a foreign intelligence exception
requirement to the Fourth Amendment would nullify oppo-
nents' arguments that question the constitutionality of FISA as
amended by the Patriot Act. Since any searches and seizures
potentially justified under a foreign intelligence exception must
still satisfy the Reasonableness Clause of the Fourth Amendment,
a simple balancing test between the governmental interest in
national security and foreign affairs and potential infringement
upon individual civil liberties must be employed. 6 6 Three argu-
ments highlight the reasonableness of FISA and the "significant
purpose" test under the Fourth Amendment. Judicial deference
to the President and executive department in the area of foreign
affairs, the increased threat to national security from extremist
terrorist organizations in the wake of September 11 th, and FISA's
similarity with Title III, all support the contention that FISA's
"significant purpose" test in section 218 of the Patriot Act satisfies
the Reasonableness Clause of the Fourth Amendment.
As discussed in Part I, there is considerable case law in the
lower federal courts supporting a limited foreign intelligence
exception to the Fourth Amendment. Several circuit courts,
namely the Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits, have justi-
fied warrantless electronic surveillance for national security pur-
poses by adopting a foreign intelligence exception to the Fourth
Amendment.1 6 7 In determining whether to adopt such a doc-
trine, these circuit courts depended heavily on the inherent pow-
ers of the President with respect to international relations, as
discussed infra. The Brown Court, for example, holds that the
President's inherent authority in national security issues autho-
rizes the President to obtain foreign intelligence without a tradi-
tional criminal warrant.
168
The difficulty with these circuit court decisions, as well as
those that have held the original FISA constitutional under the
Fourth Amendment, is that many of these rulings utilize the "pri-
mary purpose" test, which posits that the primary purpose of
electronic wiretapping must be the acquisition of foreign intelli-
gence information for reasons of national security. These deci-
165. See, e.g., United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908, 916 (4th
Cir. 1980); United States v. Buck, 548 F.2d 871, 875 (9th Cir. 1977); United
States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593, 608 (3d Cir. 1974); United States v. Brown, 484
F.2d 418, 426 (5th Cir. 1973).
166. See United States v. United States Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297,
322-23 (1972).
167. See cases cited supra note 165.
168. See Brown, 484 F.2d at 426.
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sions direcdy contradict the "significant purpose" standard in
section 218 of the Patriot Act. The decision in In re Sealed Case
dispenses with this standard because the "primary purpose" test
emerged from lower court interpretations, and finds no textual
grounding in the original FISA. The Court of Review disap-
proved of these decisions "for relying too heavily upon the prece-
dent in Truong and not upon the plain, unadorned language and
the plain intent of the original language of [the statute]."169 The
Court of Review seemed to prefer the viewpoint of the Sarkissian
court. In Sarkissian, the Ninth Circuit noted that the distinction
between acquiring intelligence information for national security
purposes and criminal prosecution purposes is virtually immate-
rial. 7 ' The fact that information acquired through national
security surveillance may ultimately lead to criminal prosecutions
is not problematic because the initial purpose of gathering such
information is to combat international terrorism, and the fruits
of these investigations can constitutionally be used in later crimi-
nal prosecutions. Thus, the reasonableness of the "significant
purpose" test under FISA is buttressed by the significant case law
articulating a limited foreign intelligence exception to the
Fourth Amendment, and the fact that some of these decisions
interpret a "primary purpose" test for foreign intelligence does
not detract from the newly amended statute's reasonableness.
While the Court of Review used in part a statutory interpre-
tation argument to justify the legitimacy of the "significant pur-
pose" of the Patriot Act, additional constitutional and policy
arguments further strengthen this argument. First, it is well-set-
tled that the executive branch, primarily the President, has both
the authority and duty to safeguard the Constitution. The Presi-
dential Oath in Article II of the Constitution requires the Presi-
dent to "preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the
United States."' 71 The jurisprudence of the Supreme Court
regarding the President's inherent authority to unilaterally con-
duct matters of foreign affairs is substantial. In United States v.
Curtiss-Wright,I7 2 the Supreme Court discussed the "very delicate,
plenary and exclusive power of the President as the sole organ of
the federal government in the field of international 
relations."'1 73
Specifically, the Curtiss-Wright Court indicated that the President
is far more knowledgeable than Congress with respect to the
President's greater opportunity to assess the issues of national
169. Bungard, supra note 140, at 18.
170. Sarkissian v. United States, 841 F.2d 959, 965 (9th Cir. 1988).
171. U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 1, cl. 8.
172. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
173. Id. at 320.
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security in a particular foreign country.'7 4 The Court further
limited foreign affairs to the discretion of the executive branch
in Chicago & Southern Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corporation,171
which held that the judiciary should not interfere with matters of
national security.' 7 6 According to the Court, foreign policy is of
a political nature, and related decisions are "delicate, complex,
and involve large elements of prophecy.' 1 77 Several years after
the Waterman decision, the Court in Keith interpreted Article II to
mean that "implicit in that duty is the power to protect our Gov-
ernment against those who would subvert or overthrow it by
unlawful means."'
171
Not only does the President have a general plenary power in
the areas of national security and foreign affairs, but the execu-
tive branch has specific authority over the collection of foreign
intelligence information.1 79 The Supreme Court has not limited
its wiretapping capabilities to electronic surveillance for the "pri-
mary purpose" of collecting national security information, which
implies that surveillance for the "significant purpose" of collect-
ing foreign intelligence information would not subvert the inten-
tion of the judiciary. Thus, it is reasonable for the Attorney
General to implement a standard that allows simultaneous crimi-
nal prosecutions and foreign intelligence surveillance against a
legitimate target with overlap between law enforcement and
intelligence officials.
Second, public policy reasons dictate that the governmental
need in protecting the United States from further terrorist
attacks of September 11 th proportions far outweighs exaggerated
concerns for the curtailment of individual privacy rights. Accord-
ing to Time magazine, "The amorphous nature of [the terrorist]
plotters' network enabled it to operate under the noses of intelli-
gence and police forces."18 ° The recent terrorist bombing in
Madrid, Spain, illustrates the ease with which terrorist organiza-
tions operate in and around target countries, and the problems
that law enforcement officials face when trying to quell such
attacks. The Aew York Times reported that "agents tracking [ter-
rorists] . . . are constrained by jurisdictional and bureaucratic
boundaries. Intelligence is far too infrequently shared... often
174. Id.
175. 333 U.S. 103 (1948).
176. Id. at 111.
177. Id.
178. United States v. United States Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 308
(1972).
179. Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105, 106 (1875).
180. Johanna McGeary, Who's the Enemy Now, TIME, Mar. 29, 2004, at 29.
FROM "THE PURPOSE" TO "A SIGNIFICANT PURPOSE"
leaving information about dangerous militants woefully incom-
plete."1 8 ' This intelligence problem is not confined to Europe,
as September 11th demonstrated how al Qaeda's efforts were
facilitated by the informational breakdown between law enforce-
ment and intelligence officials. Thus, the difficulties with infil-
trating a terrorist organization indicate that, currently, the only
practicable alternative is to condone widespread electronic sur-
veillance for the "significant purpose" of obtaining foreign intel-
ligence, which may contribute later to criminal prosecutions of
terrorists.
Finally, because FISA, as amended by the Patriot Act, pro-
vides several provisions that protect individual rights to a greater
extent than Title III and its traditional warrant requirements for
criminal investigations, civil liberties groups cannot successfully
argue that individual liberties outweigh the compelling govern-
mental need for increased surveillance powers and communica-
tion between law enforcement and intelligence officials. FISA
and Title III share several significant protective provisions, but
FISA provides additional safeguards in certain areas that far sur-
pass its Title III counterpart. First, both Title III and FISA
appear to satisfy the requirements for a warrant, as discussed in
Part IV.A. Both statutes demand prior judicial authorization for
electronic surveillance, although Title III requires a traditional
search warrant. 8" In addition, FISA and Title III contain proba-
ble cause requirements, but FISA's probable cause standard does
not mandate certification that the target has committed or is
committing a crime.1 83 Probable cause under FISA pertains only
to whether the target is a foreign power or agent of a foreign
power.' 8 4
While FISA facially appears to allow more encroachment on
civil liberties than Title III, FISA implements several measures to
further protect the public from unconstitutional searches and
seizures under the Fourth Amendment with respect to national
security surveillance. While the probable cause standard under
FISA is demonstrably lower, it is virtually impossible for law
enforcement officials to completely circumvent Title III in con-
ducting electronic surveillance with crimes that have no discern-
able nexus to national security concerns. For example, "FISA
surveillance would also not be authorized against a target
181. Tim Golden et al., As Europe Hunts for Terrorists, the Hunted Press
Advantages, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2004, at Al.
182. See In re Sealed Case No. 02-001, 310 F.3d 717, 738 (Foreign Int.
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engaged in purely domestic terrorism because the government
would not be able to show that the target is acting for or on
behalf of a foreign power."'
18 5
Ultimately, the Court of Review posited that if FISA does"not meet the minimum Fourth Amendment warrant standards,
[it] certainly comes close."'8 6 Thus, the fact that FISA closely
mirrors Title III in many respects and provides additional safe-
guards for individual liberties strongly contributes to the reasona-
bleness of FISA as amended by the Patriot Act. The combination
of the government's compelling interests in a pervasive foreign
intelligence surveillance statute to adequately combat foreign ter-
rorist threats and a reduced concern with encroachment on civil
liberties suggests that section 218 of the Patriot Act clearly satis-
fies the Reasonableness Clause of the Fourth Amendment.
CONCLUSION
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, dramatically
highlighted the startling inadequacies of prior legislation that
had been enacted to address the problems of domestic and inter-
national terrorism and underscored the need to re-evaluate this
legislation in: light of such unprecedented and catastrophic
events. The speedy passage of the Patriot Act in October 2001
quickly augmented the sparse arsenal that law enforcement offi-
cials maintained to combat terrorism by granting such officials
sweeping powers in several areas, which included facilitating law
enforcement officials in conducting electronic surveillance for
national security purposes. Section 218 of the Patriot Act
amended FISA by lowering the required threshold to conduct
surveillance against specified targets. While the Attorney Gen-
eral initially had to certify that such national security surveillance
was for "the purpose" of obtaining foreign intelligence informa-
tion, the Patriot Act authorized FISA court orders if a "significant
purpose" of the investigation was foreign intelligence surveil-
lance. The mere substitution of a few words buried in the middle
of FISA arguably caused more controversy than most other
aspects of the Patriot Act. The rallying cry of most civil liberties
groups was that FISA as amended would allow law enforcement
officials to effortlessly circumvent the traditional warrant require-
ments of the Fourth Amendment.
However, this analysis is unsupported because FISA and sec-
tion 218 of the Patriot Act clearly satisfy both the Warrant Clause
and the Reasonableness Clause of the Fourth Amendment. Sev-
185. Bungard, supra note 140, at 28.
186. Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 738.
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eral federal courts have held that FISA court orders qualify as
warrants, and the elements of the FISA statute indicate that FISA
seemingly satisfies the three requirements posited in Dalia. First,
FISA warrants are granted by neutral Article III magistrates. Sec-
ond, these court orders contain sufficient particularity with
respect to the targeted individual, any targeted facilities, and any
facts and circumstances that explain the nexus among the target,
the facilities, and the electronic wiretapping. Finally, FISA war-
rants require a reduced probable cause standard that has consist-
ently been held constitutional.
Furthermore, there are several persuasive reasons that FISA
fulfills the Reasonableness Clause of the Fourth Amendment.
First, FISA appears to fall under the special needs exception to
the Fourth Amendment, which allows law enforcement officials
to conduct warrantless searches when emergency situations arise,
which would make the warrant requirement cumbersome and
detrimental to the specified investigation. Second, the govern-
mental interest in preserving the national security of the United
States in the wake of the September l1th terrorist attacks by
engaging in foreign intelligence surveillance far outweighs indi-
vidual fears that civil liberties are being unconstitutionally com-
promised. The President's inherent authority in the area of
foreign affairs indicates that the executive branch has ample
power to engage in warrantless foreign surveillance for virtually
any purpose that has a significant nexus to gathering foreign
intelligence information. This judicial deference to the execu-
tive branch with respect to national security has contributed
heavily to the development of a limited foreign intelligence
exception to the Fourth Amendment in several courts of appeal.
Finally, FISA's multiple similarities to Title III and its additional
safeguards throughout the statute to prevent encroaching on
civil liberties indicate that individual concerns about individual
liberties are unfounded. Thus, the balancing test articulated
numerous times by the Supreme Court weighs heavily in the gov-
ernment's favor, meaning that FISA as amended by section 218
of the Patriot Act is not unconstitutional under the Fourth
Amendment.
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